From 31 March 2026, paying education agent commissions for onshore student transfers is no longer just a commercial decision. It is a compliance requirement with real consequences.
There is a regulatory change approaching that will fundamentally alter how CRICOS-registered providers manage their education agent relationships, and a significant portion of the sector appears to be unaware of it. From 31 March 2026, under amendments to the National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students, registered providers are prohibited from paying education agent commissions for the recruitment of overseas students who have already commenced study onshore with another provider. The change is not a guideline. It is not a recommendation. It is a legislated prohibition introduced through the National Code of Practice for Providers of Education and Training to Overseas Students Amendment (Education Agent Commissions) Instrument 2026, underpinned by the Education Legislation Amendment (Integrity and Other Measures) Bill 2025, which passed the Australian House of Representatives in November 2025.
The reform targets a practice the government has described as onshore poaching: the use of financial incentives to encourage education agents to facilitate unnecessary transfers of international students between providers. It is a deliberate intervention designed to ensure that student mobility decisions are made in students’ genuine interests, not shaped by commission structures that reward agents for moving students from one institution to another regardless of educational merit.
For providers who rely on onshore recruitment as a significant part of their enrolment pipeline, this is not a minor compliance update. It is a structural change to the business model. And for providers who have not yet reviewed their agent contracts, commission structures, and internal compliance processes, the window to prepare is closing.
What the Law Now Says
The new Standards 4.7 and 4.8 of the National Code 2018, as amended in January 2026, establish the prohibition and its exceptions with precision.
Standard 4.7 states that a registered provider must not give an education agent commission to an education agent where that commission is in relation to the recruitment of an overseas student who has commenced studying in a course with another registered provider. The operative word is "commenced." Once a student has begun their course in Australia, the receiving provider cannot financially reward an agent for facilitating that student’s transfer. This applies regardless of whether the student has withdrawn from their original provider, had their enrolment cancelled, or is switching to an entirely different course or qualification level.
The definition of "education agent commission" under the amended ESOS Act is deliberately broad. It encompasses any consideration or benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, that is given by or on behalf of a provider to an education agent or an associate of the education agent in connection with recruitment activities. This explicitly includes bonuses, service fees, gifts, discounted services, marketing support, and any other form of incentive. The legislation is designed to close the workarounds before they are attempted. Providers cannot simply rename a commission as a "marketing contribution" or provide non-cash benefits in lieu of direct payment. If the benefit is connected to the recruitment of an onshore transfer student, it is caught by the prohibition.
Equally significant is the expanded definition of "education agent" itself. The amended ESOS Act captures individuals or entities on casual or fixed-term contracts who engage in education agent activities. This means providers cannot circumvent the ban by restructuring agent relationships as contractor or consultant arrangements. If the person or entity is performing recruitment functions, they are an education agent for the purposes of the legislation, regardless of how the relationship is labelled.
The Exceptions: Narrow and Specific
Standard 4.8 sets out the limited circumstances in which the commission ban does not apply. Understanding these exceptions precisely is essential for providers because the margin for error is narrow.
The first exception is transitional. The ban does not apply where the overseas student has been accepted for enrolment by the receiving provider on or before 31 March 2026. Importantly, the student does not need to have commenced study by that date. Acceptance for enrolment is sufficient. This transitional provision exists to allow providers time to adjust their business practices and honour existing contractual obligations with education agents that include future commission instalments for previously recruited students.
The second exception relates to packaged courses. Where a student’s visa was granted based on multiple Confirmations of Enrolment listed on the visa application, commissions may still be paid for those listed providers and courses. This recognises that course progression within a pre-approved package is not a transfer in the problematic sense that the legislation targets. A student moving from a diploma to a bachelor’s degree at the provider specified on their original CoE is progressing, not transferring.
The third exception covers students who have completed their principal course. If a student finishes their course and then enrols in further study, that enrolment is treated as new recruitment, not a transfer. Commissions may be paid in this circumstance because the student is genuinely commencing a new educational pathway rather than being diverted from an existing one.
The fourth exception addresses compassionate and compelling circumstances, recognising that some transfers are genuinely necessary and in the student’s best interests.
What is notably absent from the exceptions is any provision for course name equivalency. If a student transfers to a provider not listed on their original CoE, the commission ban applies even if the receiving provider offers an identical course with an identical name. The legislation looks at the provider relationship, not the course title. This closes another potential avenue for creative compliance that providers and agents might otherwise have explored.
What This Means for Providers in Practice
The practical implications of the commission ban extend well beyond the simple question of whether a particular payment is permitted. The reform creates a new compliance obligation that intersects with provider governance, financial management, agent oversight, and record-keeping in ways that many providers have not yet fully considered.
Every provider with CRICOS registration needs to conduct an immediate review of their education agent agreements. Existing contracts that include commission provisions for onshore transfer students will need to be amended to reflect the new prohibition. Contracts entered into after 31 March 2026 must explicitly exclude commission payments for onshore transfers unless one of the Standard 4.8 exceptions applies. The review should not be limited to formal agent agreements. Any arrangement involving payment or benefit to a person or entity performing recruitment functions needs to be assessed, including informal referral arrangements, marketing partnerships, and consultant engagements that may involve recruitment-adjacent activities.
Commission tracking systems must be upgraded to capture the distinction between permissible and prohibited payments. For every commission paid after 31 March 2026, the provider should be able to demonstrate which category the payment falls into: offshore recruitment, post-completion enrolment, packaged course progression, or transitional exception. If a commission cannot be clearly categorised under one of the permitted exceptions, it should not be paid.
The ESOS Act also now empowers the Secretary of the Department of Education to request information about education agent commissions. Providers may be required to report the total dollar amount paid to each agent, the value and description of non-monetary benefits, and the number of accepted students recruited by each agent. This reporting power means that commission practices are no longer a private commercial matter between provider and agent. They are subject to regulatory scrutiny, and providers must be able to produce accurate, detailed records on request.
The Governance Dimension
The commission ban is not merely an operational compliance requirement. It is a governance issue that should be elevated to the attention of governing persons, boards, and senior leadership.
Under the amended ESOS framework, the fit and proper provider test now requires ESOS agencies to consider ownership and control arrangements between education providers and education agents, and whether a provider or a related person of the provider is being investigated for a specified offence. Commission practices that breach the prohibition could directly affect a provider’s fitness and propriety assessment, with consequences for CRICOS registration itself.
This means that the question of who authorises agent payments, how commission structures are approved, and what oversight exists over onshore recruitment practices are now matters of governance, not just accounts payable. Governing persons need to understand the new rules, ensure that compliance systems are in place, and satisfy themselves that the provider’s agent relationships are structured lawfully.
For VET providers in particular, where governance structures may be less formal than in the university sector, this requires deliberate attention. The owner-operator of a small CRICOS-registered RTO cannot afford to discover at audit that commission payments have been made in breach of the prohibition because nobody in the organisation understood the new rules. The financial, reputational, and registration consequences of non-compliance are significant.
Why This Reform Exists
The policy rationale behind the commission ban is straightforward, even if its implementation is complex. Commission-driven onshore transfers have been identified across multiple government reviews as a significant integrity risk in Australian international education. The Rapid Review into Exploitation of Australia’s Visa System, the Migration Strategy 2024, and the Joint Standing Committee’s integrity report all pointed to the same problem: financial incentives were driving agent behaviour that was not in students’ best interests.
The pattern was well documented. Agents would identify international students already studying in Australia and encourage them to transfer to a different provider, regardless of whether the transfer served any genuine educational purpose. The agent received a commission from the receiving provider. The student gained nothing, and in many cases lost study progress, experienced visa complications, or ended up at a provider offering lower-quality education than their original institution. The transfer was driven by the agent’s commercial interest, not the student’s educational interest.
The commission ban removes the financial incentive at the heart of this practice. Students retain the right to transfer providers under Standard 7 of the National Code, subject to the existing six-month restriction on transfers from the principal course. Students can still seek advice from education agents, and can engage agents directly on a fee-for-service basis. What they cannot be is the subject of commission-driven recruitment by agents who are paid by the receiving provider to facilitate the transfer.
It is worth noting that the reform has not been universally welcomed. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that banning commissions will drive the practice underground rather than eliminating it, with providers and agents finding alternative mechanisms to incentivise onshore transfers. Others have pointed out that there are legitimate reasons for students to transfer, including affordability, relocation to regional areas, and genuine academic progression, and that the ban may inadvertently make it harder for students to access advice and support during transfers.
These concerns are valid, and the sector should engage with them honestly. But they do not change the compliance reality. The prohibition is the law. It takes effect on 31 March 2026. And providers must be ready.
The Data Transparency Dimension
The commission ban does not operate in isolation. It is part of a broader push toward transparency in education agent relationships that providers need to understand as an interconnected compliance landscape.
ASQA has confirmed that additional education agent data will be made available to providers through PRISMS, including information about all agents used by all providers, not just those an individual provider currently works with. This data is expected to include the number of onshore transfers associated with each agent, visa grant and refusal rates for agent-referred students, and course completion statistics. Providers will, for the first time, be able to see the full picture of an agent’s activities across the sector.
The Department of Education can now also publish agent performance information, including visa outcomes, cancellation rates, and completion statistics for students recruited by specific agents. This transparency is intended to help providers make informed decisions about which agents to work with, but it also creates a new accountability layer. A provider that continues to work with an agent whose data shows a pattern of onshore poaching, even after the commission ban takes effect, faces reputational and regulatory risk.
Providers must now report all commissions paid to education agents. This reporting obligation means that commission practices will be visible to regulators in a way they have never been before. The era of commission payments being a private commercial arrangement between provider and agent is over.
What Providers Should Do Before 31 March 2026
The compliance deadline is weeks away. Providers who have not yet begun preparing need to act immediately, and those who have started should verify that their preparations are comprehensive.
The first priority is a complete audit of all education agent relationships. Every agreement, formal or informal, that involves payment or benefit for recruitment activities needs to be reviewed against the new prohibition. Contracts must be amended to reflect the ban on onshore transfer commissions and to incorporate the specific exceptions under Standard 4.8.
The second priority is system readiness. Commission payment processes must be updated to include a compliance check before any payment is authorised. That check should verify whether the student in question is an onshore transfer student, whether any exception applies, and what evidence supports the categorisation. This is not something that can be left to the accounts team to figure out. It requires a documented process with clear decision criteria and assigned accountability.
The third priority is staff education. Everyone involved in recruitment, admissions, agent management, and finance needs to understand the new rules. This includes front-line admissions staff who may be the first point of contact when an agent refers an onshore student, marketing teams who manage agent relationships, and senior leaders who approve commission structures.
The fourth priority is governance documentation. The provider’s governing persons should be briefed on the commission ban, its implications for the provider’s business model, and the compliance measures being implemented. This briefing should be documented as evidence of governance oversight in the event of a future regulatory enquiry.
The fifth priority is a review of the provider’s overall recruitment strategy. If a significant proportion of enrolments have historically come from onshore transfers facilitated by commission-earning agents, the business model itself may need to shift. Providers in this position should be developing alternative recruitment strategies now, rather than waiting until the commission revenue disappears and scrambling to replace it.
The Question That Will Matter at Audit
The real compliance risk for providers in 2026 is not whether they are paying commissions. Most providers understand the basic concept of the ban, even if they have not yet implemented the necessary changes. The real risk lies in a simpler and more searching question: can you explain why you paid this commission when asked?
Every commission payment made after 31 March 2026 needs to be defensible. It needs to be supported by evidence that places it clearly within one of the permitted exceptions. It needs to be traceable through the provider’s systems with documentation that shows who authorised the payment, on what basis, and what compliance check was performed.
If the answer to "why did you pay this commission?" relies on "that is how we have always done it," the provider has a problem. If the answer relies on a restructured arrangement that avoids the word "commission" while delivering the same economic benefit, the provider has a bigger problem. If the answer reveals that no compliance check was performed because nobody in the organisation understood the new rules, the problem extends to governance.
The commission ban is a test of whether providers take regulatory change seriously before it is enforced, or whether they wait to learn under pressure. The providers who begin preparing now, who audit their agent relationships, update their systems, educate their staff, and brief their governing persons, will navigate the transition smoothly. Those who treat it as someone else’s problem, or assume the old practices will be tolerated because they have always been tolerated, will find that the regulatory environment has changed more fundamentally than they realised.
Commissions are now a governance issue. The legislation is clear. The deadline is imminent. The only remaining question is whether providers are ready.
